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
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The naval battle of Santiago.



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


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
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
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
POSITION NO. 1.—THE SPANISH SHIPS COMING OUT.




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
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
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
POSITION NO. 3.—THE BATTLE AT ITS HEIGHT.




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

POSITION NO. 4.—FOUR SPANISH VESSELS DISABLED.




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
POSITION NO. 5.—THE BEGINNING OF THE CHASE.




POSITION NO. 6.—THE END OF THE "VIZCAYA."




POSITION NO. 6.



POSITION NO. 7.—OVERHAULING THE "COLON."



POSITION NO. 7.



POSITION NO. 8.—AFTER THE SURRENDER.

The above is a precise copy of the several charts prepared by Rear Admiral Sampson, and published by him in the *Century Magazine* of April, 1899, purporting to give the position of the vessels in both squadrons at the different stages of the naval battle of Santiago. It will be seen that Sampson in every chart places other vessels of the fleet in advance of the Brooklyn and nearer to the enemy.

The above charts are carefully drawn from the official report of the attitude of each vessel engaged in the action at its various stages, as prepared by the unanimous agreement of the navigators of each vessel and published officially by the Navy Department. It will be seen that at every stage of the battle the Brooklyn was in the front and closest to the enemy.

THE NAVAL BATTLE

OF

SANTIAGO

A. K. McCLURE

A. 172530

AYIL PRINTING COMPANY
MARKET AND FORTIETH STREETS
PHILADELPHIA

Introduction

The two articles embraced in this pamphlet were written by A. K. McClure in review of two books recently published purporting to give the history of the naval battle of Santiago. The first article given was published in "The Philadelphia Times" in review of "The Sailor's Log," of which Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans is the author, and the second was published in "The Philadelphia Record" in review of "The History of the United States Navy," by Edgar Stanton Maclay. These articles are presented to correct the sometimes gross and often malicious perversion of the truth of history.

Rear Admiral Evans' Uniquely Embellished Story of Himself and Santiago.

"A Sailor's Log," a handsomely printed volume of 467 pages just issued by D. Appleton & Co., New York, is a breezy, sparkling, rollicking story that will be read and enjoyed by the lovers of mingled history and romance. The greatest inspiration of an author is to be absorbingly interested in his subject, and in this case the author demonstrates on every page his unflagging admiration of his theme. The book is written by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, and the subject of the book is the life and achievements of Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans. The work is well illustrated, and most of the illustrations exhibit Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans in various phases of his career. We have him in the frontispiece on the bridge of the battleship "Iowa"; again in the first attempt to capture Fort Fisher he is given lying in the sand with numerous bandages well exhibited, persuading with his pistol a soldier armed with a rifle to help Evans to a place of safety; next he appears in a full page on crutches after his recovery from his many wounds in the Fort Fisher battle; next we have him in contrast as midshipman and captain; next as receiving the German Emperor on the cruiser "New York," and finally he is portrayed as receiving Admiral Cervera on board the "Iowa" after the battle of Santiago.

No more interesting story has ever been told than the "Sailor's Log," as told by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans. It is always fresh, and no incident is ever permitted to have even the semblance of staleness. He possesses what is essential in descriptive authorship—a most brilliant and exhaustless imagination—and he permits no story to lack in thrilling incident for want of a lavish supply of imagination. This adds immensely to the general interest of the volume, and but for the fact that the same style of narrative is carried into some of the more serious historical features of the book, the beautiful imagery that so often brightens or supplements facts would be entirely pardonable. But discounted by the overshadowing love of the author for his subject that is so profusely exhibited, the book is highly entertaining and instructive.

His Childhood's Happy Hour.

The story of Rear Admiral Evans' early life is told in delightful candor. There is no strained effort to make either a perfect character of the lad, or to dignify the literature employed in presenting the book. He was born in Floyd County, Virginia, on the eighteenth of August, 1846, and he grew up with all the pleasures and sorrows of the country boy who seemed to enjoy everything that came along, and took his chances to pay dearly for the fun he was always in search of. His great ambition was to get into the navy, and after having spent some time in Washington when only a lad he managed to win the favor of the Mormon delegate in Congress from Utah, Colonel Hooper, who agreed to nominate him for a cadetship at Annapolis, but it was necessary for him to go to Utah and obtain a residence there. He had to make his journey to Utah in 1859, when the transcontinental railway was hardly thought of, and he gives a delightful account of his journey, of his many adventures with the Indians, of chasing the buffalo and camping on the plains. With his fertile imagination his report of his west-

ward journey is made intensely fascinating, as is his account of his brief stay in Utah to acquire a residence, during which time he cultivated the acquaintance of Brigham Young, struggled with the prairie storms, and made himself solid with the Mormon people. In July, 1860, he had acquired the necessary residence to warrant his appointment as a cadet from that territory, and he tells in his free and easy way of the return trip that landed him as a cadet at Annapolis on the fifteenth of September. He closes that chapter by saying: "I have so far picked the oakum, now let me spin my yarn of forty years of naval life."

***He Resigns Without
Knowing It.***

His first severe trial came soon after his admission to Annapolis, when civil war appalled the country. He had to confront a divided family. His next youngest brother enlisted in the Confederate Washington Artillery, and went to the front under Pelham, and his mother severely reproached him for having deserted his State and people, but according to his report he stood by the old flag, even when it cost him scalding tears for a son of Virginia to make war upon his home Commonwealth, the boasted Old Dominion and the Mother of Presidents.

His resignation was delivered to the Navy Department and formally accepted just when the war was about to begin, but he imputes the forgery of his resignation to his mother, who wrote it without his knowledge, and had it accepted without any notice whatever to himself. Thus, as he presents it, "without previous warning I found myself out of the service despite my determination to stay in." Captain Rodgers came to his aid by telegraphing to Washington explaining that the resignation was a forgery, and he was promptly reappointed, and notice sent to him by telegraph. His first experience in the navy was with the flying squadron that was sent to look after the Confederate privateers in the West Indies. During that voyage he had

to battle with the yellow fever and rebellious sailors, and finally returned without having a chance to test the fighting qualities of the enemy.

***His First Battle at
Fort Fisher.***

This brings the sailor's yarn to the Fort Fisher campaign, in which, as is well known to all, Evans made a heroic record, and as presented and embellished by himself it makes romance pale before the strange perils and vicissitudes through which he passed without losing his life. Admiral Porter's fleet that was to move on Fort Fisher was assembled in November, 1864, at Hampton Roads. The destination of the fleet was presumably known only to the Admiral, and the only one in the fleet excepting Admiral Porter who discovered the destination was Acting Ensign Robley D. Evans. He received a letter from his Confederate brother, who was serving as a scout on General Lee's staff, which gave him notice of the movement upon Fort Fisher. In that letter his brother said: "We will give you a warm reception at Fort Fisher when you get there." The fleet under command of Porter and the army under command of General Butler, reached the neighborhood of Fort Fisher on the twenty-third of December, and on the twenty-fourth the memorable powderboat invented by General Butler for the purpose of blowing up Fort Fisher, was run into a proper position, and at two o'clock in the morning the explosion occurred that was expected to be followed by an assault. At daylight it was discovered that the powder boat explosion was a total failure, and that the fort could be taken only by bombardment and assault.

Acting Ensign Evans was naturally chosen by Commander Schenck to go aloft on his vessel with good glasses and locate if possible some guns that were annoying him. Ensign Evans promptly responded, took his position in the mizzen rigging just below the top, deliberately took a hard-tack from his pocket and placed it in his mouth to masticate

leisurely while he was adjusting his glasses to locate the guns. He found the guns at once, saw the gunners train them directly upon him and his ship, and in a few seconds a puff of smoke that he described as something like a lamp-post, crossed the field of his glasses, and immediately the rigging was cut four feet below him and he swung down into the mast. Not having breakfasted satisfactorily his first thought, as he tells us, was about his hard-tack, but he records the pathetic story that the hard-tack was gone, as he never found even a crumb of it, and he adds: "I am sure that I swallowed it whole." When he got down on deck to make his report he was amazed to discover that his knees were shaking and he feared the men would see it, but he pulled himself together, finally got them into shape and immediately warmed up to his work. This thrilling experience of Acting Ensign Evans seems to have been the nearest to a disaster that was suffered by the fleet. Careful examination by General Butler resulted in the decision that the fort was too strong to be carried by assault and the expedition was abandoned.

Second Fort Fisher Battle.

Both General Grant and Admiral Porter were not content with the result of the first movement against Fort Fisher. The fleet was ordered to Beaufort, North Carolina, well filled up with coal, ammunition and stores, and General Alfred Terry, who was placed in command of the army, and Admiral Porter then made their second and successful attack upon the fort. A naval force was ordered to land and assist the army in the assault by attacking the sea face of the fort while the army attacked the northwestern end of it. Volunteers were called for, and of course as Ensign Evans happened to be officer of the deck when the order came, he immediately put his name as first in the list of volunteers, and there was great rivalry among the navy boys for permission to join in the land assault.

On the thirteenth of January, 1865, the fleet opened fire on the fort, and Ensign Evans was in charge of the commodore's barge that carried thirty-five or forty men who made the first landing of navy forces for the assault. At three o'clock in the afternoon of the fifteenth the order came for the naval force to charge, and it started on its long run of 1,200 yards over the loose sand. When it got within 500 yards of the fort the column stopped and went down, as the author says, "like a row of falling bricks," leaving every man flat on his stomach. They were then ordered to make another charge, and after advancing 300 yards they again went down under the terrible fire of rifle and canister. Ensign Evans was then near enough, as he reports, to see and recognize the men on the parapet. He saw Colonel Lamb, the Southern commander, standing on the wall and urging his men to shoot the Yankees. Evans concluded that the best thing for him to do would be to shoot Colonel Lamb, and he drew his revolver and fired a deliberate shot at him, but as he fired, a bullet ripped through the front of his coat across the breast, turning him completely around so that he was not permitted to see the effect of his shot at the Confederate colonel. He felt a burning sensation over his heart and saw blood coming out of a hole in his coat, but he had not time to bother about it. He concluded that if a bullet had gone into a vital portion of his body he was done for, so he disregarded the wound and went on at the head of his command.

Evans and the Sharp-shooter.

As the naval force approached the stockade Ensign Evans discovered that one particular sharpshooter was deliberately firing at him at a distance of not over one hundred yards, and he struck Evans in the left leg about three inches below the knee. The force of the ball landed him on his face in the sand, but he immediately pulled a silk handkerchief out of his pocket, bound up his wound and hastened

to the front. He and seven others of his command made a rush and got into the stockade, when his sharpshooter friend sent another bullet through his right knee, and he realized that with a bullet through both knees he was not in a good condition to make another charge, or even to retreat. He tried standing up, but his legs would not permit it, and he was compelled to rest where he was.

The naval force was repulsed when, as Ensign Evans states, two minutes more would have given them the parapet in a hand to hand struggle, but the naval men retreated down the beach and were put into trenches to oppose Bragg and there served until the fort was captured. Of the eight who went inside the stockade all were shot down, including Evans. He fortunately had half a dozen silk handkerchiefs along with him, and he managed to bind up his wounds to such an extent as to prevent his death by loss of blood; but in the meantime his sharpshooter friend would not permit him to have peace. According to the story as given in the log, the sharpshooter was only thirty-five yards away from Evans, and as the experienced sharpshooters of 1865, after four years of training, were among the most expert in the world, there seemed to be but little chance for Evans to escape with his sharpshooter specially gunning after him at easy pistol range. Not only did this sharpshooter amuse himself by shooting at Evans, but addressed him personally in what the story says was "uncomplimentary language." The sharpshooter must have been greatly absorbed and diverted from his purpose by the anathemas he hurled against the wounded and defenseless naval ensign, as it required the fifth shot, according to the memory of the author, to hit Evans again, and then he shot Evans in the foot, taking off one of his toes and the sole of his shoe. Until this time Evans had borne the compliments and balls of the sharpshooter with reasonable tolerance, but when he had shot at Evans five times and finally was so disrespectful as to cut off

one of Evans' toes, Ensign Evans, as he says without knowing why, became "unreasonably angry," and he immediately rolled over in the sand so as to look his antagonist in the face and "addressed a few brief remarks to him." While Evans was delivering his oration to the erratic and garrulous sharpshooter, he saw a freshly loaded rifle handed to the sharpshooter, and Evans being then "unreasonably angry without knowing just why," fired, aiming at the breast. Of this singularly romantic and tragic event the author says:

"I knew all the time that I should kill him if I shot at him, but had not intended to do so until he shot me in the toe. My bullet went a little high, striking the poor chap in the throat and passing out at the back of his neck. He staggered around after dropping his gun, and finally pitched over the parapet and rolled down near me, where he lay dead."

***Evans' Sublime
Courage.***

This incident sublimely illustrates the dominating qualities of Ensign Evans. He was courageous enough to permit a sharpshooter to fire at him five times at short range in the interim of conversations between them, but he states that he did not intend to kill the sharpshooter until his fifth shot at thirty-five yards distance left Evans minus a toe and a shoe sole. His heroism on the occasion was equaled only by his magnanimity to a stranger skilled in sharpshooting, who was firing deliberately at him at short pistol range, but Evans knew that he could kill the sharpshooter whenever it pleased him to do so, and when he became "unreasonably angry" he was driven to the terrible determination of ending the sharpshooter's life.

After killing the sharpshooter, Ensign Evans decided to take a rest, as he was greatly enfeebled by his wounds, and he fell asleep. When he awoke it was some time before he could get his bearings, but he finally discovered that he was in some sort of a sand bed, and that the tide was rapidly coming

in upon him. He was helpless to get out, and he expected to be "drowned like a rat." He could not use his legs, but finally, after a great effort, succeeded in rolling himself sideways out of the hole. When he got out he saw a marine a short distance from him, well protected by a pile of sand, and firing deliberately at the fort. He called to the marine to pull him in behind his pile of sand, but the marine preferred not to expose himself to the Southern fire.

***The Pistol Argument
with the Marine.***

The marine was playing sharpshooter himself with his rifle, but Ensign Evans decided that the way to persuade the marine to come out and expose himself to take Evans under cover was to draw his pistol and propose to kill him if he refused. As Evans was lying in the open with nothing but a revolver, and as the marine was protected behind a sand bank with a rifle, the only possible explanation of the marine's obedience to Evans' order at the point of the pistol, is that he must have known that Evans would kill him some way, no matter how, and he left his cover, exposed himself to the fire of the enemy, and took Evans into safety. The language of the author is: "I persuaded him with my revolver to change his mind, and in two seconds he had me in a place of safety."

To add to the grotesqueness of the story the pistol of Ensign Evans was soaking wet and could not have been fired, but it answered the purpose, and the protected marine, armed with a rifle, was summoned to offer his life to protect Evans, who was entirely exposed and could have been killed by the marine any moment. Why he should have exposed himself to a hurricane of bullets from the enemy when he was fully armed himself, to escape the impotent pistol of Evans whom he could have killed any time, is one of the strange occurrences that the author does not seem to have thought required logical explanation. Thus having finally, after great forbearance, killed the loquacious sharpshooter

***Evans Not Entirely
Alone in Capturing the
Fort.***

Fortunately, Ensign Evans mentions in an entirely incidental way at the beginning of his story of the capture of Fort Fisher, that there was a fleet there commanded by Admiral Porter and a military force commanded by General Terry. But for this casual statement any one who reads Evans' story of the capture of Fort Fisher would be ignorant of the presence of any others in that sanguinary conflict than Evans and his little body of naval men, with the Confederate sharpshooter whom he killed, and the marine behind the sand bank whom he threatened to kill with a water-soaked pistol.

Of course, the battle was unimportant excepting so far as Evans and his surroundings were concerned, although the naval force under Evans' command made a charge up to the fort, was repulsed, ran away and was finally lodged behind breastworks until the army captured the fort. Had Evans forgotten to tell of the retreat of his entire force, the average reader of his story of the capture of Fort Fisher would logically assume that he did it principally himself. It is obvious that with his innate modesty he chose to prevent the reader from being misled into a belief that Evans had captured the fort himself, by a brief incidental mention of the fact that there was a large army and a large fleet to support Ensign Evans in his great achievement.

***Evans a Rollicking
Roamer.***

After the close of the war Ensign Evans became Lieutenant Evans and he applied for active service, in response to which the Navy Department assigned him to the "Piscataqua" in October, 1867, to accompany Admiral Rowan in a cruise to China. From that time until 1870 he had the usual rollicking time, and gives most delightful stories of his experiences at Cape Town, China, Japan, the Philippines and Oriental affairs generally. In July, 1871, he was assigned to duty at the Annapolis Naval Academy, and he

gives a very entertaining story of the admission and treatment of the first colored naval cadet. The sable embryo naval officer had a hard time of it, of course, and the dignity of the naval service was maintained by dismissing a New York bootblack cadet and the colored cadet for general misconduct and incompetency. After two years at Annapolis he was again ordered to sea as a navigator on the sloop of war "Shenandoah." This cruise took him to England, Morocco, Madeira, Liberia, Africa, Spain, Carthage and other places of interest, and his story of the cruise is embellished up to his best standard of imagery. On his return he was ordered to Baltimore on waiting orders, and was soon thereafter placed in command of the gunboat "Yorktown," in which he took a cruise to Chile, where he joined Captain Schley, then in command of the "Baltimore."

*Evans Settled the
Chilean Affair.*

He was present in Chile at the time of the serious trouble with that government that brought us to the verge of war, and he gives extensive extracts from his diary telling how Captain Schley in Chile and the government at Washington had very imperfect knowledge of the situation, while he alone seemed to understand it. The whole difficulty arose from a drunken brawl that resulted in the killing of some of Captain Schley's men, and in a few days it was fanned into a national issue. It has been generally accepted by the government that Captain Schley performed his duty with great skill, and opened a way for maintaining peace without any sacrifice of the dignity and honor of the government, but Commander Evans, who remained after Schley and his vessel had been ordered away, seems to have forgotten to mention it. In this difficulty, as in the little difficulty that resulted in the capture of Fort Fisher, Commander Evans seems, according to his story, to have been the hero of the occasion. He was always dying for a fight, but never got it, and, failing to get a fight, he congratulates himself that he

brought the Chileans to an honorable peace. From Chile he sailed to the Bering Sea, where he made the acquaintance of an earthquake, had a jolly time in the social whirl, was fascinated with Arctic scenery, took a whack at a volcano, wrestled with a hurricane, and individually solved the intricate seal question that had defied the statesmanship of the country and the diplomacy of nations.

Evans Opens the Kiel Canal.

In 1894 Captain Evans was assigned to the command of the "New York," then the only armored cruiser in the navy, and soon thereafter made a short trip to Europe to join the ceremonies at the opening of the Kiel Canal. It is somewhat difficult, in looking over Captain Evans' graphic account of this cruise, to ascertain that Admiral Kirkland was in command of the fleet, and that the "San Francisco," "Marblehead," "Alliance" and "Columbia" belonged to it. The vessels composing the squadron are found only incidentally in the statement that when he reached Southampton the "San Francisco," "Marblehead" and "Alliance" were there, but not the "Columbia," and Admiral Kirkland's presence in the squadron is casually mentioned in the same paragraph in the statement that he would not take the squadron to Kiel, but ordered the "New York" to meet him at Copenhagen, whence they would go to the opening of the canal. Admiral Kirkland transferred his flag to the "New York" and proceeded with Captain Evans to the grand celebration, but from the time the ceremonies began until they were concluded Captain Evans was the only naval officer who seems to have been in evidence.

Evans Entertains and Instructs the Emperor.

The Emperor of Germany gave a dinner to the officers of the different fleets, where Evans was presented to the Emperor, who gave him a "cordial handshake and kept others waiting quite five minutes," while he talked to the American captain. At the reception given on one of

the German battleships on Sunday Admiral Knorr greeted Captain Evans, telling him: "The Prince says you are a good fellow, and he wants the Emperor to know you." He soon after was introduced to Prince Henry and Princess Irene, and he rounded out the ceremonies grandly by inviting Emperor William and Prince Henry and ten admirals to dine with him on board the "New York." Admiral Kirkland's presence on his own flagship that was commanded by Captain Evans is incidentally mentioned on the occasion of this dinner that Captain Evans was supposed to give to the German Emperor. He mentions the fact that Admiral Kirkland welcomed the Emperor, and that seems to have been the end of the admiral's duty on the occasion.

There is no report given of what Admiral Kirkland said, but Captain Evans says: "I made him (the Emperor) a short speech, telling him that we had the champion twelve-oared cutter of the American navy, and asked on the part of my crew the honor of naming her for his daughter Victoria Louisa. He was really touched by the compliment, and taking my hand granted my request most graciously."

Naturally enough Captain Evans regards this dinner as "one of the most delightful I have ever seen, a perfect success, and George, my steward, who bossed the entire affair, was as proud as a peacock."

Captain Evans conducted the Emperor over the entire battleship, and received high compliments from the German ruler for the completeness of his vessel. He also instructed the German Emperor as to the necessity of having a strong navy, to which the Emperor "listened very attentively," but when he had finished, the Emperor said: "Captain, unfortunately my Parliament does not entertain the same view of the question." Captain Evans, understanding the situation much better than the German Emperor, replied: "If your Majesty will permit me to say so, I think you will eventually bring your Parliament to think as I do."

***Admiral Kirkland only
a Figure-head.***

It was certainly considerate and gracious on the part of Captain Evans thus to take the entire labor of entertaining the German Emperor off the hands of Admiral Kirkland, who is not reported as having had any part whatever in receiving or amusing the Emperor beyond an address of welcome when the Emperor came on board, which is not deemed of sufficient importance to be reported even in abstract. It is not surprising that after this interesting hospitality to the German Emperor, in which the Emperor seems to have recognized Captain Evans as the only officer worthy of notice, he should conclude his views of the German Emperor in these words: "He was to me the picturesque figure among the ruling heads of Europe." The celebration of the opening of the Kiel Canal appears to have been planned and conducted wholly by Captain Evans, assisted by the Emperor of Germany, while Admiral Kirkland, on whose flagship the Emperor was entertained, had nothing whatever to do beyond enjoying his cigar on deck or in his cabin.

***Evans Instructs the
Government to Prepare
for the Late War.***

After the return from the Kiel celebration Captain Evans was detached from the "New York" and assigned to the command of the "Indiana," the first of our battleships, but after a short cruise with her he was again detached and assigned to duty on the Lighthouse Board. This brought him into close relations with Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, to whom he unfolded a prophetic story of the coming war with Spain. He had the confidence of Roosevelt, and through Roosevelt he made his impress upon the Secretary, as he states that it was through Roosevelt's "earnest recommendations to Mr. Long that many most important steps were taken." He was assigned to an inspection tour along the coast and gulf, and about the middle of March he arrived at Key West on his way to Washington.

He saw the weakness of the navy, and says: "I hurried on to Washington, determined to give Mr. Long my views on the subject," and with the assistance of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt he induced the department to order the purchase of a number of fast yachts and tugs to be armed with all dispatch and hurried off to Key West. He was then ordered to relieve Captain Sampson, who was in command of the "Iowa," as Sampson was promoted as Acting Rear Admiral to command the North Atlantic fleet. He pays high tribute to Rear Admiral Sampson, who seems to be the only man in the American navy who is a close second to Rear Admiral Evans in naval sagacity. He sailed with Rear Admiral Sampson to blockade Havana, and he gives an interesting description of his first night on blockade duty. All the other officers of the navy were very apprehensive of the torpedo boat, and, strange as it may seem, Captain Evans shared that apprehension. It appears to be about the only instance in which he did not understand the situation better than anybody else. He was on the watch the first night and phantom torpedo boats were around him in countless numbers. To use his own language: "I was on the bridge during the entire night, and if I saw one torpedo boat I saw a thousand. Every breaking sea was to my imagination a torpedo boat." An interesting chapter is devoted to the movement of the fleet upon San Juan, but as it was without special result, there is nothing in it that need be quoted here to give completeness to the sailor's yarn.

Evans Forgetful About We now come to the most interesting chapters of Rear Admiral
Schley. Evans' story. On the eighteenth of

May he was signaled by Commander-in-Chief Sampson to proceed to Cienfuegos and report to Commodore Schley, and on Sunday, May 22, he stopped the "Iowa" two hundred yards astern of the "Brooklyn" off Cienfuegos. On the night of May 23, he says, it was reported to him "that there

were three white lights in line on shore, which I knew was a signal from the insurgents that they wished to communicate." He adds that he took it for granted that Commodore Schley understood the signal, but he seems to have forgotten to signal Commodore Schley the fact that the lights were discovered and what they meant. He is forgetful also of the fact, well known to him at the time he wrote the chapter, that Admiral Sampson did not give Commodore Schley the insurgents' signals when Schley was started hurriedly off to Cienfuegos, and it was not until Captain McCalla arrived the next day on the "Marblehead" and delivered to Commodore Schley the insurgents' signals that Schley was enabled to ascertain definitely whether the Spanish fleet was in Cienfuegos.

A Surprising Omission. Considering Captain Evans' general appreciation of the fact, that from his own standpoint he was always better advised than anybody else about him, it is surprising that he did not inform Commodore Schley of a signal that he understood, and was the only man in the fleet who did understand it, assuming that his story is not purely imaginary. He did not communicate the signal to his commander, although nearly a full day elapsed after he knew of it until the signal was recognized, and then only after Captain McCalla had arrived, charged with the duty, among others, of giving it to Schley. Rear Admiral Evans is forgetful also of the fact that a letter written by Rear Admiral Sampson to Commodore Schley on the twentieth of May specially charged him with the duty of ascertaining definitely whether the Spanish squadron was in Cienfuegos, and gave it as his deliberate opinion that it would naturally seek Cienfuegos or Havana to receive and deliver supplies.

When Commodore Schley ascertained definitely, as he was instructed, that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos, he immediately sailed for Santiago in obedience to orders. On

the twenty-sixth of May Schley's flying squadron reached Santiago, and the only information Captain Evans has to give is that, so far as he knew, no attempt was made to determine whether the fleet was in the harbor or not. Captain Evans, of course, knew that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago, and seems to have been the only man who did know it, but he forgot to mention it to any of his fellow officers or to suggest it to his superior officer. Possessing as he did the exclusive information of the location of the Spanish fleet, he affects great surprise that Commodore Schley left Santiago, and after proceeding for some distance westward the squadron was stopped for some time, and then had to go back in the direction of Santiago. This is all the information that Evans gives about the movement of Commodore Schley from Santiago westward, and as he was present and knew the facts, his memory is strangely at fault in not presenting at least some measure of the truth.

Where Evans' Imagery Fails. He knew that Commodore Schley left Santiago because he had been for more than twenty-four hours in a heavy gale that made it impossible for him to coal his vessels at sea, and he knew also that the collier, a miserable old hulk that Sampson afterward selected to sink in Santiago harbor, became disordered in her machinery, and it was most unwise to remain on blockade when the squadron could not be coaled. He knew also that it was a very difficult matter, as the fleet was then provided, to coal a vessel at sea even in a calm, and Rear Admiral Sampson gave his testimony to the difficulty of coaling his fleet at sea when he ordered the "Massachusetts," the twin sister of the "Oregon," to leave the line of blockade at two o'clock in the morning of the naval battle to go to Guantanamo to be coaled, thus taking from the battle one of our most powerful battleships. In his description of the movement he has not a kind or even a respectful word for his commander, and

concludes his story by recalling the fate of Admiral Byng, that might have been repeated in the fate of Commodore Schley had Cervera's fleet escaped "while we were tinkering at the machinery of a collier." The suppression of all important facts relating to this movement spoils the beautiful imagery of Rear Admiral Evans, and the chapter is one of the very few stale products of his pen.

Rear Admiral Evans next reports the discovery of the "Cristobal Colon" in Santiago, and his fertile and latitudinous imagination locates the Spanish war vessel outside of the harbor under the protection of the forts with her fires hauled and entirely helpless. In this, as in many other statements made by Rear Admiral Evans, there is a very decided difference of views, he being on one side and pretty much all others who have information on the subject being on the other side. He represents the "Colon" as in front of the Punto Gorda battery, and to use his own language, "she lay helpless and at our mercy." He describes the movement on the thirty-first of May, when the "Massachusetts," "New Orleans" and "Iowa" were ordered to fire upon the "Colon," and complains of the distance Commodore Schley required him to maintain from the Spanish batteries. It may be that Evans had not instructed Secretary Long to give the order to the commanders of our fleets not to expose war vessels to the fire of the Spanish forts. It is the only logical way to account for his failure to give that explanation of the signal "do not go in any closer," when, according to his account, he proposed to rush in with the "Iowa," demolish the Spanish batteries, defy the torpedoes and sink the Spanish fleet himself. It is evident that Commodore Schley did nothing right, either in the blockade or in the battle of Santiago, but we are left in doubt as to whether Captain Evans gave him the necessary information to make the best use of the squadron. When Admiral Sampson came on the first of June everything was lovely. The blockade was immediately made

effective for several reasons, which Evans seems to overlook, among which are a large increase of the fleet and the increased facilities for supplies.

Evans Refutes Himself as to Commander of Fleet. Rear Admiral Evans' description of the battle of Santiago, in which he took an active part during the early stages, and in which it is not questioned that he behaved heroically, conveys the impression to the casual reader that that great battle, the grandest in the history of naval warfare, was fought chiefly by Capain Evans, whose vessel was distanced when half the Spanish fleet was destroyed, and by Rear Admiral Sampson, who was never near enough to fire a gun even at long range upon the enemy's vessels, and never near enough to one of his own vessels to deliver a signal order to it when actually engaged with the enemy. It is generally known that there were others engaged in that battle, but the public must go outside of Evans' story to ascertain the name of any other officer who achieved distinction in that struggle. Early in the morning Commander-in-Chief Sampson left the field with his flagship to meet General Shafter, and he signaled the fleet: "Disregard the movements of the commander-in-chief." Any other officer of the navy than Rear Admiral Evans would say frankly that such a signal from the commander-in-chief devolved the positive and responsible command of the squadron upon the next senior officer, but there is not a line or word in Evans' report of the Santiago battle that refers to Schley as in command of the fleet. He quotes the Sampson signal, but says it indicated merely that we were to "close up somewhat so as to cover the interval caused by her (the "New York's") absence, all of which was perfectly understood by the fleet."

It is evident that Evans changed his mind as to the meaning of such an order from the commander-in-chief within a very few months. In a previous chapter, telling of the

blockade of Havana, he records the sudden movement of the flagship "New York," to chase a prize ship that was reported flying the signal: "Disregard movements of the commander-in-chief." Evans was then second in rank, and his understanding of the order at that time is given in his own words: "I, as next in rank to Sampson, hoisted the guide flag, and as senior officer present held the fleet to its course, etc." He claims, and doubtless with justice, that the "Iowa" was the first to detect the coming of the Spanish fleet out of the harbor. The men of his vessel must have been blind if they did not see the movement of the enemy before any other vessel, as the "Iowa" was in the centre of the semicircle of the blockade, and the only vessel that was directly facing the harbor and could see into it farther than any other.

***Evans Destroys the
Spanish Fleet.***

When the Spanish came out it was only natural that Captain Evans, of the battleship "Iowa," decided to sink the whole fleet himself. His first purpose was to ram or torpedo the Spanish flagship "Maria Teresa," but as his vessel ran only about half as fast as the "Teresa" at the time, he logically gave up his heroic idea, but he went at her hammer and tongs, swung off to port to give her a starboard broadside, and then swung back quickly to hit across the bows of the second ship, the "Viscaya." He whirled his vessel around, at least in imagination, so that he could bring all his guns to bear now on the "Teresa," again on the "Viscaya," and then on the "Colon," but he found that all passed him, and he then swung to port, gave the flying "Viscaya" a parting broadside, and headed in to tackle the "Oquenda." In reporting his attack on the "Oquenda" after he had practically destroyed all the other cruisers, he remembers that the "Oquenda" was under the concentrated fire of several of our ships, and he had very little more to do, as "she rolled and staggered like a drunken thing, and finally seemed to stop her engines." After he had given vital

wounds to four Spanish cruisers he left the other vessels of the fleet to clean up the crippled enemy, and he turned his attention to the two Spanish torpedo boats. He says: "We turned our rapid-fire guns and the after guns of the main battery on them, and at the same time other ships concentrated on the little game cock." In a very few minutes he saw that one of them was blown up, and only a few minutes later the second shared the same fate.

It is a common belief that Commander Wainwright, of the little steam yacht "Gloucester," destroyed the two Spanish torpedo boats by one of the most brilliant and heroic movements of the entire battle, but it is quite probable that Captain Evans could not see the little "Gloucester," and supposed that he was doing the work that was done chiefly by the "Gloucester," and he has evidently not read much of the history of the battle. After he had thus more or less disabled the four Spanish cruisers and destroyed the two Spanish torpedo boats, the fast vessels having passed beyond him in pursuit of the "Colon," he tells us that "God and the gunners had had their day." It was only natural that he concluded that the battle was ended when he ceased to have any part in it. He says: "At this point the battle of Santiago may be said to have terminated; at any rate I took no further part in it."

Evans' Embarrassment Over Phantom Battles. While the "Brooklyn" and "Oregon" were pursuing the "Colon," Captain Evans devoted his attention to rescuing the wounded Spaniards, and he received on the "Iowa" not only Admiral Cervera, but Captain Eulate, of the "Viscaya," and several hundred Spanish unfortunates who had been rescued from the water. He gives a most romantic account of the reception he gave to the Spanish officers, and of their generous appreciation of his courtesy. About the time that he had the Spanish prisoners comfortably settled on his ship he gives a highly original story of his

embarrassing condition when felt compelled to start in pursuit of an enemy's battleship that was reported to be but a little distance in the east. He tells that Captain Eaton, of the "Resolute," passed him and signaled to him: "Enemy's battleship to the eastward." Of course, that was just the medicine for Captain Evans' complaint, but he did not know how to go into action again with several hundred Spanish prisoners on board. He stowed them away as safely as possible, and, according to his own report, he started at full speed to give battle to the new Spanish vessel. True, he saw the "Indiana's" smokestacks as she lay at her station off Santiago quite near to where the new Spanish battleship was reported, but when he reminded Captain Cotton, of the "Harvard," that if there was a Spanish ship there the "Indiana" would certainly know it, he received the answer, as he reports it: "Bob, he has fooled Taylor. Don't let him fool you."

Of course, Captain Evans could not be fooled into letting the Spanish battleship get away, and he sailed for her, given orders to open fire at 5,000 yards; but just when he was about to train his guns on the vessel, the signal came from her mast that she was an Austrian. Thus Captain Evans was deprived of the opportunity to add another Spanish vessel to what he had already destroyed in a single day.

When it is remembered that Captain Evans made no mention whatever of his chase after the Spanish vessel in his official report of his movements on the third of July, and when in addition it is remembered that Commodore Schley in his report of the same action tells of the order received from Admiral Sampson to take the "Oregon" with the "Brooklyn" and look up this Spaniard, and that he did so, and was about to open fire on her when she signaled that she was an Austrian battleship, it may be accepted as an open question whether Captain Evans did not in some way tangle himself up with Commodore Schley in this chase after the

Spanish man-of-war. As he destroyed about all of the other vessels of the Spanish fleet, it is natural that he should feel that he must have had some hand in trying to find another one, but the record evidence on one side, and the forgetfulness of Captain Evans to make any mention of so important a movement in his official report, would seem to make his story a mere phantom pursuit of what proved to be a phantom Spanish battleship.

Munchausen only once in his life confessed that he had found his superior in his economy of truth, and he complained bitterly that his distinction in his vocation had been impaired by the only one in all the world who had ventured to dispute his crown, but Robley D. Evans had not then been born.

Edgar Stanton Maclay's Maliciously Untruthful Story of Santiago.

The history of the American Navy must ever be quite as inspiring, as instructive to every American citizen interested in the progress of the Republic. Our navy, like our army, has attained the highest possible achievements in every conflict we have ever had with a foreign power, beginning with our feeble, improvised war vessels during the Revolution. In the second war with England our naval victories made the triumphs of the army pale, and during the civil war, that began with our few ships scattered to the four winds of the earth, a navy was speedily created so formidable as to astonish the world, and the victories of Farragut and Porter and others stand out among the great achievements of naval history. The climax of naval achievement, however, was reserved for the Spanish war, when, in the naval battles of Manila and Santiago every Spanish vessel was destroyed with the loss of but a single life and without serious injury to any of our war ships. Thus in two naval conflicts Spain was effaced from the list of naval powers, and our victories stand out in the annals of history as the most wonderful achievements of the world's naval warfare.

We have before us the third volume of "The History of the United States Navy from 1775 to 1901," by Edgar Stanton Maclay, presented in a new and enlarged edition, hand-

somely illustrated and beautifully printed by D. Appleton & Co., New York. It is a very full, and should be a very complete, history of the navy in the Spanish war. The author has already published a "History of American Privateers and Reminiscences of the Old Navy," besides editing the "Journal" of Senator William Maclay, of Pennsylvania. He seems to have been a careful student of the old-time history of the navy of the country, that is now presented with the jealousies and passions which so often deform history at the time of great achievements, consigned to oblivion, and his record of our wars with England and of our civil war appears to have been presented entirely without prejudice. But the cloister student is seldom equipped to ascertain the truth of history in the midst of the fierce resentments which achievement ever creates, and when Mr. Maclay came to deal with the recent Spanish war he mingled a most violent partisanship with his lurid rhetoric, and has stamped discredit upon his entire work.

***Indispensable Qualities
of the Historian.***

Two qualities are indispensable to a standard public history. First, the historian must clearly demonstrate his freedom from prejudice or partisan interest, and his ability to hold the scales of justice in even balance, when confronted by the violent disputes of jostling ambition. Second, he must be scrupulously truthful, and especially must he be truthful when he attempts to crown heroes with laurels or to deprive heroes of claimed triumphs. In both of these essential attributes Mr. Maclay has failed in his presentation of the history of the Spanish war. He does full justice to Admiral Dewey, as none dispute his eminent achievement, but in his story of naval movements in the West Indies, resulting in the destruction of Cervera's fleet, he is not only violently partisan, but goes beyond most of the common defamers of Rear Admiral Schley in his effort to degrade him and transfer the laurels of Schley to Sampson.

If Mr. Maclay's history of the Spanish war in the West Indies is true Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, who commanded the Flying Squadron and was in active command of the fleet, by reason of the absence of Rear Admiral Sampson when the naval battle of Santiago was fought, was an incompetent, a coward and a liar, while Sampson is entitled to be ranked as one of the greatest of American naval heroes.

The Author is Let us ask Author Maclay to take
Maliciously Partisan. a deliberate look at his defamatory references to Admiral Schley. In his chapter of contents (page 15) we have the following: "Schley's slow progress toward Santiago; his vacillating course before that port; fictitious lack of coal; a golden opportunity lost." Again (page 16) referring to the Santiago battle, we have "Schley's humiliating retreat." In his chapter on the preliminary movements of the fleet (page 291) he charges Commodore Schley with an indifference to the important duty of ascertaining whether Cervera's fleet was in Cienfuegos, and declares that Schley could easily have reached the shore regardless of the heavy sea if he had been "really anxious" to perform his duty. In the same chapter (page 293) he speaks of the "lack of decision and enterprise which were so apparent in Schley's failure to promptly ascertain whether or not Cervera's squadron was in Cienfuegos." Again (page 296), he declares that Schley "in his report about the coal supply of the vessels under his command exhibited either a timidity amounting to absolute cowardice, or prevarication of facts that were intrinsically falsehoods." Again (page 297), he says: "As to Schley's timidity regarding the possibility of the ships coaling at sea, the facts of the case are that on the two following days the squadron coaled from the "Merrimac," omitting the important fact, testified to by all the officers of the fleet, that a gale of unusual severity had prevailed, but that he was enabled to coal two days later because the storm had abated.

Again (page 298), Schley "turned in catiff flight from the danger spot toward which duty, honor and the whole American people were most earnestly urging him. Viewed in whatever light it may be, the foregoing dispatch cannot be characterized otherwise than as being without exception the most humiliating, cowardly and lamentable report ever penned by an American naval officer." Again (page 301), he implies cowardice on the part of Schley because in his first bombardment at Santiago he remained practically out of range of the forts, and instructed Lieutenant Sharp, of the "Vixen": "Don't expose your vessel; she is vulnerable, and your guns can do no harm to the enemy at the range we shall use," in which he simply repeated his positive orders from the Navy Department.* Again (page 303), he imputes cowardice to Schley by what he gives as a statement of Rear Admiral Sampson to the author as follows: "We (Sampson) recognized the 'Colon' at daybreak and immediately started in to investigate the meaning of the remarkable circumstance of an enemy's vessel, practically unsupported, lying in plain view of an American squadron of superior strength, which was stationed far to the southwestward of the harbor. Before we could get within range the 'Colon' fired a defiance gun and did not appear again until July 3."

***Studied Purpose to
Defame.***

If Rear Admiral Sampson sent such a statement to the author his memory is strangely defective or he has deliberately stated what is untrue. According to his own official account he arrived in front of the "Cristobal Colon," then visible at the mouth of the harbor, at six o'clock in the morning, and the log of the "Colon" shows, as published by our own Navy Department, that at 10.35 the

* Do not risk so crippling your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon thereafter successfully fighting the Spanish fleet if they shall appear on our side.—*Official order from Navy Department.*

The orders of the Department were not to risk needlessly the loss of a vessel until Cervera was disposed of.—*Sampson in Century article.*

"Colon" "got under way, and under direction of the commanding officer cast to starboard and under a slow speed passed between Punto Gorda and the bow of the 'Oquendo.'" The bombardment of Schley is described on the same page as follows: "This timid, nervous attack on Cervera's ships was the more disappointing when we remember the elaborate and brave preparations Schley had made to get at the enemy in earnest," and again (page 304), he refers to the blockade as "Schley's farcical blockade," and adds that it cannot be "described otherwise than a wilful disobedience of orders." Again (page 364-65), he imputes to Schley cowardice in turning the "Brooklyn," and a falsehood in explaining it, declaring that Schley's first given excuse, as he presents it, is untrue, and that the "second excuse is even more unmanly than the first."

We give these statements of the author's studied purpose to defame Commodore Schley in the Santiago action so that the author may see them grouped together in cold type, and study them in connection with the fact that he scrupulously avoids presenting in his history of the battle that Commodore Schley was in actual command of the fleet from start to finish of the conflict, and that his flagship, the "Brooklyn," was nearest the enemy when the first gun was fired and until the last Spanish flag was struck. Throughout the whole chapter of Santiago, from the first to the last paragraph, there is not an honest presentation of any creditable act performed by Commodore Schley. Every truth, however well known to the government and to the world, that could award honor to Schley is either absolutely omitted or maliciously perverted, and there has not been a defamatory utterance about Schley from the meanest of his persecutors and the most disreputable of his newspaper assailants that the author does not attempt to crystallize into history by accepting it as true. This feature of the work clearly shows that the author was so blinded by prejudice as to make him wholly incapable

of judging the truth, or that he is for some reason the bitter personal enemy of Schley, and seeks to crucify him by embalming him in history as an incompetent, a coward and a falsifier. Such prejudice exhibited on every page of the story of Santiago must make every fair-minded citizen reject Mr. Maclay's history of the Spanish war, not only as utterly unworthy of credit, but as worthy only of the contempt and execration of every patriotic citizen.

***Recklessly
Untruthful.***

Next let us test the truthfulness of Mr. Maclay's story of the Santiago battle. This volume has only been issued a few months, and the author had access to all the records of the government, and to the testimony of all who could present the truth in relation to the grandest naval victory of the world. In regard to the search for Cervera's fleet at Cienfuegos it is needless in this review to rehash the many conflicting statements which have been presented. Sampson gave Schley the best reason for believing that the destination of Cervera's fleet would be Cienfuegos or Havana, and Schley was specially charged to be positive as to the presence or absence of the Spanish at Cienfuegos while Sampson guarded Havana. This is shown by Sampson's letter of May 20 to Schley (suppressed by Sampson) telling him that while the Navy Department inclined to direct the fleets to Santiago he (Sampson) had decided "to make no change in the present plan—"that is, to make an exhaustive search at Cienfuegos. Referring to Schley's return to Santiago the author says: "He occupied nearly forty-eight hours in the run, which could easily have been accomplished, in spite of rain and rough weather, in half the time," a statement that every naval officer knows to be unwarranted unless Schley had left his fleet and gone alone with the "Brooklyn," as his fleet could not proceed any faster than it did because of the coaling vessel and others of slow speed. His next statement is that when Schley reached San-

tiago he stationed his squadron about twenty-two miles to the southward, and persists in the assertion that the blockade never was in range of the guns of the enemy in day time, and that it retired twenty-five miles south at night. If this statement is true then the logs of the vessels of Schley's fleet are strangely false. The logs of the "Texas," the "Massachusetts," the "Iowa," and the "Marblehead" all state that the vessels steamed off the harbor from day to day at a distance of from four to six miles, and the log of Captain Evans' vessel, the "Iowa," is more specific than most of the others, telling how his vessel, along with the fleet, was near the harbor day and night. Taking the author's account of Commodore Schley's movements in blockading Santiago, the reader could come to no other conclusion than that Schley was utterly incompetent or utterly cowardly, and that he either had no conception of his duty or had not the courage to perform it. Fortunately for Schley, the logs of his squadron tell the true story and refute the defamatory statements of the historian.

There could be no more conclusive evidence that Schley performed his duty in his preliminary movements from Cienfuegos to Santiago with reasonable fidelity than is furnished in the fact that neither the Navy Department nor Rear Admiral Sampson, Commander-in-Chief, nor the President at the time called him to account to question his courage or capacity. If Schley was guilty of a tithe of what is charged to him by the author of this work, it would have been criminal on the part of the Commander-in-Chief not to remove him from command, and alike criminal for the Navy Department not to summon him to answer for inefficiency or incompetency before a Court of Inquiry; but at the most crucial period of the war Schley was uncensured by either, left as second in command of the fleet, and his record uncriticised by official sources until after he had fought the great battle of the war, destroying the Spanish fleet, and had fairly won the highest

honors that the country could award him. To assume that he was guilty of incompetency, cowardice or falsehood is a direct reflection upon the intelligence or integrity of the President of the United States, of the Secretary of the Navy and of Rear Admiral Sampson for permitting such a man to hold a most important command, and one that, as it happened, made him commander of the fleet when the great battle was fought.

***Sampson's Actions
Reviewed.***

We now come to the important period of the Santiago campaign when Rear Admiral Sampson appeared on the scene with both squadrons under his immediate command, thereby more than doubling, and probably trebling, the power of the Spanish fleet. The author says (page 325): "With the true instincts of the strategist, Sampson realized, as soon as he had secured Cervera in the harbor of Santiago, that a naval engagement of decisive moment must occur off that point before the crucial blow of the war could be given." Sampson arrived at Santiago at six o'clock on the morning of June 1, and, according to the author, he was greeted by "a shot from a vessel (the 'Colon') lying in undisturbed possession of the harbor entrance." In what purports to be a statement from Sampson to the author of the work, Sampson states that when he saw the "Colon" at daybreak he "immediately started in to investigate the meaning of the remarkable circumstance of an enemy's vessel, practically unsupported, lying in plain view of an American squadron of superior strength." The Spanish vessel (the "Colon") that thus fired upon Admiral Sampson at six o'clock in the morning, when he first arrived at Santiago with his squadron, remained just where it was when it fired upon him for four hours and thirty-five minutes after his arrival, as it is officially shown that the "Colon" did not move until 10.35 of that morning. What would a commander possessing "the true instincts of a strategist" have done when

fired upon by an "unsupported" vessel of the enemy when he had two squadrons united which could have destroyed the "Colon" in a few minutes? The general impression would be that Sampson, instead of going to inquire of Schley why he did not destroy the "Colon," would have immediately summoned his fleet into action; but he did not fire a gun, nor did he order an attack to be made. All he seems to have done, according to Mr. Maclay's chapter on Santiago, was to run away from a single Spanish vessel to scold Schley for not destroying it. And when Sampson did get his fleet together for a council of war, after he had allowed the "Colon" to go back into the harbor, what did the instincts of the strategist dictate? Did he propose to engage the enemy? On the contrary, his first suggestion and final command was to close the entrance to the harbor so that he could not get in to fight the Spanish fleet, and that the Spanish fleet could not get out to fight him. Sampson alone was responsible for the effort to close the harbor of Santiago, and thus make a conflict between the two fleets impossible; and it was fortunate for the country, and for the combined squadrons commanded by Sampson that his effort to sink the "Merrimac" in the harbor was a total failure. Up to that point the only success he seems to have achieved was to make a failure in what he regarded as his most important strategic movement.

After completing his arrangements for sinking the "Merrimac" in the harbor he arbitrarily removed Captain Miller, a gallant officer in the line of command, who made his protest in tears, and when the "Merrimac" was about ready for the movement and sailed out to Sampson's flagship for final orders, Hobson, in his *Century* article, tells how "the true instincts of the strategist" developed in Sampson. Just then a craft was discovered far out in the waters, apparently standing toward the harbor, and the prospect of a prize made the commanding strategist forget the important movement to be made in the harbor, as he hurried off with his flagship

without ceremony to capture the supposed prize. Hobson describes it most eloquently, saying that when he had put the helm to starboard to steer up to the flagship, "Suddenly the 'New York' started up, her propeller race began to seethe and she shot by us at full speed. We looked ahead, and on the horizon, to the southeast, discovered a craft standing toward the harbor. The craft stopped, turned about, and took to her heels, and a chase was on. The quarry was fleet, and had ten or twelve miles start. She drew hull down, and then disappeared. The 'New York' stood straight on, and gradually disappeared, and for a long time the two columns of smoke told of hot pursuit." This was early in the morning, and Hobson continues: "A scorching sun rose in the cloudless sky; not a breath of air stirred; a blinding glare came out of a glassy sea, and a day of waiting lay before us. We remained there until late in the afternoon." It was not until four o'clock that the commanding strategist got back to his squadron without a prize.

***Sampson Left His Fleet
Outclassed.***

We now come to the battle of July 3. It was a beautiful, clear, calm Sunday morning, when any vessel of the fleet could have coaled at sea. The first important event of that fateful day was the movement of the "Massachusetts," the twin battleship of the "Oregon," and one of the two most powerful vessels of the squadron, and the "Suwanee," which shortly before dawn were ordered away to Guantánamo for coal. Both the Spanish army and the fleet were in a position of extreme peril. It was reasonable for any commander to assume that a naval conflict might be precipitated any moment, and yet one of the most powerful vessels of the squadron was sent away to a distant point for coal, when the sea was calm, after Schley had been censured for not coaling at sea in a terrible gale, and was thus lost to our fleet in the struggle. The second important event of that day was the movement of the "New York," at ten minutes before nine

o'clock, when Sampson displayed the signal to the squadron: "Disregard movements of Commander-in-Chief," and sailed away from the blockade line toward Siboney, where he had an appointment for a conference with General Shafter. It was entirely proper for Sampson to go and confer with Shafter, as Shafter was ill and could not come and confer with him, but he committed an unpardonable error in taking his flagship with him. He could have taken a steam launch, or any of the small swifter crafts, and made the journey in half the time, leaving his important ship in battle line. There were but two vessels in the entire joint squadrons which, according to their registration, were capable of running with the four Spanish cruisers. They were the "New York," Sampson's flagship, and the "Brooklyn," Schley's flagship. Sampson thus took away one of the two vessels of his fleet regarded as capable of making a successful running fight with the Spanish squadron, and actually left his large squadron outclassed for a running fight by the absence of the "Massachusetts" and the "New York." The only possible explanation of Sampson taking his flagship away from the fleet, after having sent the "Massachusetts" away earlier in the morning, is in the fact that he deemed it his duty to himself to sail away in state to meet Shafter, who would have been compelled to journey for the conference in a mud wagon or on a mule. Had Sampson gone in one of the small and swifter vessels, or in a steam launch, he not only would have left his important ship ready for the battle, but he could have returned himself in time to participate in it. But for the fact that the "Oregon" developed unexpected speed, because of the superb management of its machinery and men by Captain Clark in its voyage from San Francisco, the "Colon" would certainly have escaped, and possibly the "Viscaya."

***Sampson's Moral
Cowardice.***

It is not doubted that Admiral Sampson is one of our most accomplished naval officers, and had he possessed the courage to be entirely just, alike to himself

and to his fellow-officers in the battle of Santiago, he would to-day be one of the most beloved and respected of our heroic men; but he positively effaced himself from the affections and trust of the country and of the world by his moral cowardice in two vital matters. He has by every possible method, short of stating the untruth in positive terms, sought to convey the impression to the public and the world that he was in the action at Santiago. In point of fact the "New York" had disappeared from view of the fleet when the Spanish vessels came out, and while he promptly turned his vessel in obedience to the thunders of the battle, and exhausted her powers to get into the conflict, it is a fact that at no time during the action was he within signal distance of any vessel of his fleet then actually engaged with the enemy. His signal when he departed from the fleet placed Commodore Schley in actual command, and had there been any misdirection of the vessels in action, or a disaster suffered, Commodore Schley would have been held responsible, not only according to the laws regulating the navy, but he would have been held responsible in the considerate judgment of the world.

If Sampson had exhibited the moral courage and manliness of Admiral Sir John Jervis after the battle of St. Vincent, who recognized Nelson, a subordinate, as the hero of the battle, and frankly stated that while absent on the line of duty Commodore Schley had fought the Spanish squadron and destroyed it, he would have been honored as the Commander-in-Chief, and would be greeted with the huzzahs of the people wherever he appeared. Jervis took Nelson in his arms and welcomed him with tears as the hero of St. Vincent, but Sampson has studiously sought, without direct assertion, to create the impression that he was present in the battle, that it was fought in accordance with his commands, and that he is entitled to the full honor for the victory. His bombastic report of the battle, claiming the credit as entirely

due to himself, stands in our naval records as a blistering reproach to Rear Admiral Sampson. In one other particular he was guilty of moral cowardice in its most repulsive features, as it involved an attack upon a brother officer by stealth. Only a week after the battle of Santiago Sampson wrote a confidential letter to the Secretary of the Navy, in which he suggests promotion for the men who had been conspicuous in the action. There was not only no word of commendation for Commodore Schley in that communication, but he refers to Schley's "reprehensible conduct," while confessing that he could not separate it "from his subsequent conduct," referring to his action in the battle. At that time and for weeks thereafter Sampson and Schley met with apparently the most cordial relations, and not an intimation was given by Sampson that he had by confidential communication, made a grave accusation against the Commodore. It is the law of the navy that any officer making accusations to the department against a fellow-officer must, at the time of transmitting such charges, furnish the accused party with a copy of the complaint made against him; and certainly the relations which Sampson professed to maintain toward Schley made him bound not only by common courtesy and decency, but by the laws of the navy, to have communicated to Schley the reproach he had cast upon him.

***Author's False Story
of the Battle.***

The fidelity of the author of this work to truth in presenting the story of the battle of Santiago is very clearly illustrated by his reference to the action of the different vessels. He seems to have adopted the story of Captain Evans' persistent self-glorification. He tells how Evans first saw the enemy coming out of the harbor, forgetting to state that as Evans was stationed in a direct line south of the mouth of the harbor, he was in a position to see any vessel moving in the harbor before it would be visible to any other of our ships; and then Evans fired the first gun. After firing

the first gun Evans gave battle to the "Teresa," then to the "Oquendo," next to the "Viscaya," and the intelligent reader would naturally assume from the author's story that Evans and the "Iowa" were the chief factors in destroying the Spanish fleet, although it was one of the first of our war vessels that was distanced in the race. We next have a detailed account of the heroic services rendered by the "Texas," and we are also told how the "Indiana" and the "Oregon" were in the hottest of the fight, but the only reference made to the "Brooklyn" is an elaborate attempt to explain why the "Brooklyn" was struck more than all the other ships combined without having been specially exposed in the action. A historian, to give the story of the greatest naval achievement of the world, and give in detail the action of every important vessel but the flagship that was in the front of the battle and closest to the enemy from beginning to end, would generally be held as lacking the ordinary intelligence that would require history to be at least plausible. There is not a single creditable reference to Schley or the "Brooklyn" in the whole story of the battle. On the contrary, he is charged with cowardice and incompetency, and lest the author might be misunderstood, he states distinctly that it was the "Oregon" and not the "Brooklyn" that captured the "Colon." It would be worse than grotesque to claim that such a story can be accepted as approximating the truth of history.

***Sampson Not
in the Chase of the
"Colon."***

In the description of the chase after the "Colon" (page 369) that was made solely by the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon," the former always being closest to the enemy, the author persists in presenting the "Texas" and the "New York" as being in the chase. He says: "Speeding after her (the 'Colon') were the 'Brooklyn' and 'Oregon,' while the 'Texas,' with the 'New York' farther behind, was rapidly coming up. These four ships

now settled down to a determined chase." The point of this false statement is in the effort of the author to connect Sampson and the flagship "New York" with the chase of the "Colon." He again refers to this chase (page 370), saying: "The four American ships presented a magnificent spectacle as they raced through the sea along the coast of Cuba under the cloudless sky." In fact, the flagship "New York" was never in sight of the "Colon" or of the "Brooklyn" during the entire chase. It is possible that the smoke from her stack might have been visible, but the vessel was not, and Admiral Sampson was no more in the chase after the "Colon" than was the "Massachusetts" that was off at Guantanamo for coal. It is worthy of note that neither the author in his entire story of Santiago, nor Admiral Sampson in any report or statement he has ever made, gives the time at which the "New York" arrived at the captured "Colon." The last Spanish vessel struck her flag at 1.15 p. m., and precisely one hour and eight minutes later the "New York" arrived. If Captain Chadwick's statement of the speed of seventeen knots is correct, the "New York" was over twenty-two miles distant when the "Colon" was captured. It is evident that Chadwick's statement to prove his efficiency as a captain in handling his vessel is not precisely correct; but, giving the "New York" a speed of anywhere from thirteen to fifteen knots, she was at a distance that would make her visible only by the smoke from her stacks. Thus, instead of commanding in the battle, as the story of the author would leave the intelligent reader to infer, the story of Sampson participating in the chase of the "Colon" was simply an awkwardly invented fiction to give Sampson the appearance of having been in actual command of his fleet.

Author's Climax of Malicious Falsehood. But the climax of unpardonable ignorance or of the deliberate per-
version of the truth of history is given by the author (page 363), in describing the turning

of the "Brooklyn" when it was in danger of being rammed by the "Maria Teresa," and also of blanketing the fire of one or more of the vessels of our own fleet. We quote the full text of this statement as follows :

Observing that this ship, the "Infante Maria Teresa" was making in his direction, Schley ordered the helm aport, all the other large American vessels having put their helms to starboard.

"You mean starboard, sir," the navigator of the "Brooklyn" ventured to inquire.

"No, port," was Schley's rejoinder.

"But that will carry us into the 'Texas,'" said the officer.

"Let the 'Texas' take care of herself," was the heartless reply, and the shameful spectacle of an American warship supported by a force superior to the enemy's—a warship whose commander had expended such vast quantities of ammunition in target practice in the presence of a fashionable hotel at Hampton Roads, in order to meet a worthy foe—deliberately turning tail and running away was presented.

There is no excuse for an author, assuming to present the story of the naval battle of Santiago, reprinting and attempting to crystallize into history a falsehood that could be corrected by every captain of the fleet engaged at Santiago. The incident of the turning of the "Brooklyn" has many times been published substantially as the author of this work presents it, charging cowardice upon Commodore Schley, but the falsehood has been so clearly answered that for many months past even the most violent defamers of Admiral Schley have refrained from repeating it. They know not only that it is untrue, but that it has been absolutely proved to be untrue, and in the presence of every captain in that engagement. If the author, as he states in his introduction, submitted his statements to the naval officers he names, among whom are the captains engaged at Santiago, it is not possible that all of them could have passed over this state-

ment, knowing as they all do that it is a deliberate falsehood, invented in malice to detract from Schley the honors he so nobly won when he was actual commander in the most successful naval battle of the world's history.

Commodore Schley gave no order for the turning of the "Brooklyn," and no such conversation was had. The order for the "Brooklyn" to turn was given by Captain Cook, with the knowledge and approval of Commodore Schley. Cook was in the conning tower, where he could instantly handle the vessel, and Schley was on the open bridge from start to finish of the battle. On this point we are not speaking without the most conclusive evidence of the correctness of what we say. For a year or more this alleged order by Commodore Schley and alleged conversation with him on the bridge of the "Brooklyn" have been eliminated from the many malicious scandals which have been invented by less successful naval officers to advance themselves and impair the triumph of Schley, and they were eliminated because the precise truth was finally brought out at a conference between the captains who commanded in that action and President McKinley held in the White House. During that conversation the President inquired of Captain Cook who had given the order for the "Brooklyn" to make the turn, to which Captain Cook promptly responded that he had issued the order, and that he was prepared to submit to the considerate judgment of the naval authorities of the country and the world for its justification. This statement was made in the presence of Captain Evans, the Munchausen of Schley defamation and Evans glorification, and it was also made in the presence of Captain Chadwick, of Admiral Sampson's flagship, who, according to his own account, was not only in the battle of Santiago, although never in sight of the enemy's ships until they were destroyed, but also directed the movements of the army in effecting the surrender of the Spanish general and his command.

Not one of these captains questioned or criticised the movement of the "Brooklyn" in the presence of the captains and the President, and from that time until now the malicious falsehood about Schley's order and the conversation on the bridge of his ship has not appeared in any reputable newspaper, and we have not seen it in print for many months until it is revamped by the author of this work. Any naval officer would know that no such conversation could have been had in the heat of action when the commander had given a peremptory order, and the wisdom of the movement was fully vindicated by the great service the "Brooklyn" rendered in the destruction of the fleet. On a recent social occasion the writer hereof heard one of the captains engaged in that battle, and who rendered heroic service, say that there was one criticism that could be made of Commodore Schley's handling of the "Brooklyn" in that action, and that was that he was not justified in exposing the "Brooklyn" as he did to the broadside fire of the enemy when it was the only vessel in the squadron that could be relied upon in a racing fight with the Spanish ships. If there was any element of doubt from our American standpoint as to the wisdom of turning the "Brooklyn" it is certainly removed by the concurrent testimony of the Spanish officers, including Cervera and his captains, whose reports clearly prove that the aim of the fleet was first to destroy the "Brooklyn" by ramming, if possible, and thus enable the fleet to escape.

Apart from the question of whether the "Brooklyn" was properly or improperly turned at the time, the importance of criticising this book as a history of our navy is in the fact that the author has given in detail the scandal that had died because abandoned by those who were malicious enough ever to use it, and presented it as an historical fact, when every captain of the fleet heard from Captain Cook himself, in the presence of the President, that the order was given by him and not by Commodore Schley, although entirely approved

by Schley and in perfect accord with the purpose they both had in view when they started into the action. This resurrection of the most malicious and practically abandoned falsehood when the sources for correction were within easy reach of the author stamps his whole work as unreliable, and must efface it from the standard or even respected histories of the American navy.

Soon after the Spanish war the writer hereof interrogated Commodore Schley as to the turning of the "Brooklyn," and he promptly answered that he had not given any order at all, although it was what he would have done within a very few moments if Captain Cook had not done it. He issued no order and had no conversation with any of his subalterns relating to it. When asked why he had not stated the facts, his answer was that if he did so it would be claimed by his enemies that he was trying to evade the responsibility of turning the "Brooklyn," and that he could well afford to wait until the truth would come out in some conclusive way. Captain Cook was also silent, for the reason that had he spoken to the public it would have been regarded as an apology for the act and an attempt to relieve Commodore Schley; but when all the captains were face to face with each other, and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, Captain Cook told the truth, and no one then or thereafter in Captain Cook's presence dared to dispute it.

***Naval Records
Vindicate Schley.***

As the author assumes and attempts to maintain that the turning of the "Brooklyn" was an act of cowardice on the part of Schley—an accusation that has never been made or intimated by any officer of the navy engaged in the action—it is well to turn to the testimony of the enemy. In the "Naval Appendix" (page 558), we find an article from Admiral Cervera, who commanded the Spanish fleet, and who was in the "Maria Teresa" as his flagship and led the Spanish fleet in coming out of the harbor.

He says in his report that is accepted as authentic by our own government: "The 'Maria Teresa' steered toward the 'Brooklyn,' which was at the right of the entrance to the bay, and which was the vessel most dreaded on account of her speed." In his official report of the battle to Captain General Blanco, also published as official by the Navy Department (War Notes No. 7 of Navy Department, page 123) Admiral Cervera says: "As soon as the 'Teresa' went out at 9.35, she opened fire upon the nearest hostile ship, but shaping her course direct for the 'Brooklyn'; for it was of the greatest importance to us to place this ship in a condition where she could not make use of her superior speed." In his testimony before the Spanish court-martial Admiral Cervera said: "The only individual and the only ship of which I had the least fear was Admiral Schley and the 'Brooklyn'; but for his skillful maneuvering my squadron would have escaped." Captain Concas, who commanded the flagship "Maria Teresa" and was chief of staff to Admiral Cervera, in his account of the battle, also printed by the Navy Department (War Notes No. 8, page 68), says: "Supposing, therefore, that the 'Brooklyn' was at her usual station when we came out, the 'Maria Teresa' was to engage her in battle, endeavoring to ram her, and while the rest of the enemy's squadron were grappling with the flagship the other ships headed by the 'Viscaya,' without delay to succor the 'Teresa,' were to pass in column between her and the coast and endeavor to escape." On page 74 of the same statement Captain Concas says: "In compliance with the order received, I put our bow towards the cruiser 'Brooklyn,' which, putting to starboard, presented her stern to us and fired her two after turret guns, moving to the southward." Such is the testimony of the Spanish officers who came in immediate contact with the "Brooklyn," showing that they started out under orders to destroy the "Brooklyn" and that the destruction of that vessel was averted by the rapid turn

by which she maintained her fire from her after turret guns.

***Author Refuted by
Other Histories.***

It is worthy of note also that Mr. Maclay's history is the only work making any pretence to character or respectability that makes the accusation of cowardice against Commander Schley. There have been many histories of the Santiago battle written, and a number from pens unfriendly to Schley, but not one that we can recall has ventured to reproduce the malicious falsehood about Schley's alleged order and conversation in turning the "Brooklyn," or imputes cowardice to him in the remotest degree. In "The Story of the War of 1898," a carefully written and admirably illustrated history by W. Nephew King, a lieutenant in the United States Navy, and which has the endorsement of Rear Admiral Evans to the extent of writing the naval preface for the work, the movement of the "Brooklyn" is thus presented:

At this time the "Brooklyn" was about a mile away from the "Maria Teresa" and heading bows on for her. She was thus exposed to the fire of the "Teresa," "Viscaya," and "Colon," and to avoid placing herself within the ramming circle and exposing her starboard broadside to the enemy, ported her helm and executed a loop, after which she steered a course parallel to that of the Spanish vessels. This maneuver, which in the heat of the action was criticised by some, proved to be a masterly movement. Had she put her helm to starboard and turned to the northward and westward, as was first intended, not only would she have run the risk of being rammed, but of being torpedoed as well, for at that time it was not known where the torpedo boats were, and it was but fair to suppose that they would be found on the unengaged side of the Spanish vessels, where they should have been ready to dash out under cover of the smoke.

This chapter of Mr. Maclay's elaborate work is in itself sufficient to discredit it as a standard history with every intelligent and fair-minded citizen, and when the impartial

historian comes to write the story of this greatest achievement in the history of naval warfare, after the mean jealousies and inflamed passions of the present shall have perished, Mr. Maclay's work will be remembered only as one of the most violent of partisan productions evolved from the studied efforts of the Navy Department and of ambitious and dependent naval officers to falsify history by destroying the hero of Santiago and transferring his laurels to one who claims them, without having fired a gun in the action, or given an order to one of his vessels when actually engaged with the enemy.

Sampson and Schley

Contrasted.

Let us contrast the relative attitudes of Admirals Sampson and Schley as they appear before the country and the world in the controversy that has grown out of the Santiago battle. We have shown that Sampson has yet to give even the semblance of credit to his second officer in command, who, by reason of Sampson's absence, was compelled to assume the responsible command of the fleet in the battle. In Sampson's report to the Government he makes no reference to Schley, and studiously conveys the impression that he (Sampson) was in immediate command. Within a week after the battle Sampson wrote a confidential letter to the Secretary, commending for promotion all who had rendered distinguished service, and, instead of naming Schley as among those who were entitled to honors, he charged him in a cowardly and indefinite way with "reprehensible conduct." In all the malignant assaults which have been made upon Admiral Schley not a single word in his defence has come from Admiral Sampson or Captain Chadwick, of the "New York," although none knew better than they that Schley and the "Brooklyn" were first in the fight, and nearest to the enemy at every stage until the last Spanish vessel struck her flag, and that the only man killed in the action stood beside Schley on the bridge

of the "Brooklyn." His attitude toward Schley in public and private was that of malignant enmity, and it is an open secret that when Admiral Sampson was urged to bring the North Atlantic fleet to this city for the Grand Army National Encampment, the name of Admiral Schley had to be effaced from the list of invited guests, lest such an invitation might deprive the occasion of the presence of the fleet. Even in the hour of victory, when the heart of the commander of the fleet should have been overflowing with gratitude, and Schley had signaled Sampson as soon as the "New York" arrived within signaling distance, the complete victory, saying that there was glory enough for all, the curt and frigid response of Sampson was: "Report your casualties."

And how has Admiral Schley borne himself in this terrible ordeal of organized defamation, that has been sustained largely by official sanction? He has never yet uttered a single word of criticism or reproach upon any fellow-officer. He has publicly and privately refused to discuss the falsehoods of his malignant accusers, and he has relied upon the truth of history and the intelligent judgment of the American people to do him justice. In his official report of the Santiago battle, made to Sampson three days after the fight, he generously says: "I congratulate you most sincerely on this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had the opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us." In his letter to the Senate, called out by the official action of that body, Schley said: "As to the battle of Santiago and the destruction of Cervera's fleet, I have nothing to say here; the facts of that contest speak for themselves." When the brave men of the "Brooklyn" cheered Schley to the echo, when the capture of the "Colon" was announced, his only response was that the victory was due to the gallant "men behind the guns." Instead of claiming the credit for the

capture of the "Colon," because he was in command of the vessels which captured it, he generously and justly signaled to Captain Clark, who had rendered such potential service: "Well done, 'Oregon'; thanks for your splendid assistance." In no utterance that he has made in public or private has he ever claimed any special credit for the victory of Santiago, and he has been silent under a floodtide of defamation such as has never surged against any great hero of the past.

***The Schley-Clark
Incident.***

An incident exhibiting this feature of Rear Admiral Schley's character came under the immediate notice of the writer of this article. A considerable amount of Spanish coin was taken from the sunken "Colon" by the government, and it was purchased by a prominent banker of Washington for the purpose of making it a tribute to Commodore Schley. A few gentlemen in Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington were advised of the purpose, and promptly contributed the money to purchase the silver, and representatives of the contributors met at Washington to confer as to the proper form the tribute should take. Schley was invited to be present, when he was first advised of the purchase of the silver and the purpose to which it was to be applied. He was greatly affected by the generous action of the contributors, but while profoundly grateful to them for their action, he said, substantially: "I could not in justice to myself and to the navy accept a silver service to be made out of the coin taken from the 'Colon' without having it divided with Captain Clark, of the 'Oregon,' without whose aid the 'Colon' would not have been captured." The amount of silver was quite ample to make a double very handsome service of silver, and it was at once decided that Schley's request would be complied with. The writer was charged with communicating the fact to Captain Clark, and on the following day had a conference with Captain Clark on the subject. It is needless for us to give any details of that

conversation, as Captain Clark wrote a letter to Admiral Schley expressing his views on the subject, and permitted the writer to take a copy of it. As it criticises no one we take the liberty of publishing it in this connection without the knowledge of either Schley or Clark, as follows :

NAVY YARD, LEAGUE ISLAND, PA., November 13, 1899.

*Rear Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U. S. N.,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR ADMIRAL:—Last night I was shown an article in *The Philadelphia Times*, in which it is stated that you suggested that I should be honored in the same way that you will be by the contributors who wish to present you with a set of silver made from the Spanish coins found on board the "Cristobal Colon."

I am not surprised that the first thought of the man who said "there is glory enough for all" should have been "there is enough for two," especially as you knew that the glorious four hours of the third of July were only the nearest and best of those that make up the many years of our friendship. But as the contribution was made solely for you, and as no thought of me entered into the minds of any of the contributors, I cannot permit your suggestion to be carried out, although I understand it was unanimously accepted and heartily applauded by those who heard it. Please express to them the gratitude I feel, for I am truly appreciative of the honor they would confer; indeed, they have greatly honored me already, and I could not accept anything more. I know I am imposing a hard duty upon you, but the contributors should, of course, be informed as soon as possible, and I have to depend upon you to reach them and to explain to them why I could not avail myself of their generous intention and desire.

But it will be easier for you to do that than for me to thank you for your more than considerate act. I am deeply affected by it, for it calls to mind the signals "Well done, 'Oregon,' thanks for your splendid assistance," and "Welcome back, brave 'Oregon,'" made by the man who led the stormers over the Southern rampart at

Chemulpo,* where victory alone could save from death and perhaps torture. With kindest regards, I am, dear Admiral,

Sincerely your friend,

C. E. CLARK.

On the very same day that Admiral Sampson sent his cowardly letter to the department, charging Schley with "reprehensible conduct," Commodore Schley, without the knowledge of Sampson, cabled to the Navy Department: "Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of July 6 have attributed victory on July 3 almost entirely to me. Victory was secured by the force under Commander-in-Chief of North Atlantic Squadron, and to him the honor is due. . . . I do not doubt for a moment that full and proper credit will be given all persons and all ships in the official report of the combat." Again, on the twenty-third of July, in a letter addressed to Lieutenant-Commander Parker, speaking of Sampson, he said: "The victory was so unique in completeness, so marvelous in its glory as to be large enough for all to participate. I feel no wish to exclude any one, and if I had announced the victory I should carefully have noted all whose prominence of action had helped it. I think that omission was a mistake. It has caused some thoughtless expression, and I hope no friend of mine will keep this matter alive while the facts, coldly recited, are sufficient."

Rebuke from the Army and Navy Organ. It is a painful duty to declare to the world upon unassailable evidence that a pretentious history of the United States Navy is not only utterly unworthy of credit, but deserves the severest criticism as a violently partisan, defamatory and untruthful presentation of one of the most important victories of the American navy. If we stood alone

* Chemulpo was where Schley led the charge in capturing the Korean forts on the Salae River, after two days fighting, in June, 1871.

in thus condemning this work as false and malicious there might be some question as to the justice of our criticism; but when it is remembered that this work stands single and alone among the reputable histories of the war in charging Admiral Schley with incompetency, cowardice or falsehood, and that *The Army and Navy Journal*, the recognized organ of both army and navy, whose columns have uniformly exhibited the warmest friendship for Admiral Sampson, denounced Mr. Maclay's third volume as unworthy of respect and unfitted to occupy a position in the library of the Naval Academy, the author can hardly fail to appreciate the fact that he has committed a blunder that is worse than a crime. *The Army and Navy Journal*, of July 13, 1901, has a leading editorial on Mr. Maclay's third volume of the "History of the Navy," from which we quote the following:

We believe that the two early volumes of Maclay's history have been adopted for the instruction of the cadets at the Naval Academy. If this third is added at Annapolis with the sanction of the Navy Department, will not the cadets when they read it ask themselves what punishment was bestowed upon this naval officer who will thus be charged by the department, by indirection at least, with being a coward and a liar, and with turning his back upon the enemy in the crisis of a great naval battle?

Turning to the records of the Navy Department, they will find that not one word of official censure was bestowed upon this recreant officer; that on the contrary he received the same recognition and reward as those concerning whose conduct no question has been raised—that is, commendation in orders and promotion by numbers.

As for Mr. Maclay, his volume is so infused with the spirit of bitter prejudice and partisanship as to be totally unworthy of the name of history. In the account of the operations at Santiago more space is devoted to Schley than to any other commander, but it is in an attempt to make out a case against him in such a spirit of disingenuous unfairness as to disgust the fair-minded reader; as, for instance, when the Spanish reports are quoted and the fact is suppressed that they show how the attack of the Spanish squadron was

so concentrated on the armorless "Brooklyn" as to necessitate a line of action on the part of her commander differing from that of the other captains. The reports of Cervera and his captains make it perfectly apparent that Schley at least thwarted the main purpose of their attack, which was to disable the "Brooklyn," so that they could escape.

We are in no sense partisans of Admiral Schley, but we are in this, as in all other matters, the friends of fair play and honest dealing, and this civilian critic, in his zeal to serve his cause, has gone beyond every fair judgment upon Schley, however severe that may be, and incidentally has presented the severest possible arraignment of a Navy Department which could permit honors to be bestowed upon such an obvious liar and coward, as Maclay declares Schley to be.

The People Make History as to Heroes. Another very important fact that no intelligent and impartial historian would have overlooked, and that speaks trumpet tongued against the criticism of Schley by Mr. Maclay, is the pronounced action taken on the issue by a Republican Senate and a Republican House during the last two Congresses. Both Houses of each Congress were in political accord with the Administration, and the power of the Administration was exhausted to assure the promotion of Sampson over Schley, but neither Senate nor House would permit it to be accomplished. When the nominations of Sampson and Schley were first before the Senate for promotion that made Sampson the senior, the Senate not only refused to give the confirmation, but demanded of the Secretary of the Navy a statement from Schley that had been suppressed (also suppressed by the author), and after its presentation to the Senate and the public the Senate was nearly or quite two to one against Sampson and against the policy of the Administration. The fact that the Republican Senate and the Republican House of two Congresses defiantly maintained the position that Sampson did not merit, and could not be

given, promotion over Schley is one of which an honest historian would not only take note, but which should make him take pause in assailing the judgment of the leading statesmen of the country, who have the best opportunity of knowing the truth, and who had every political persuasion to support Sampson. And another unmistakable judgment on the issue is that of the American people. They cannot be deceived as to a hero. They may be deceived by demagogues in politics, but the man who fights the battle is always known to them, and the man who does not fight the battle, but claims credit for what others have done, is ever despised by them. Wherever Schley has gone since the battle of Santiago the hearts of the people have leaped up in spontaneous and most enthusiastic welcome, while Sampson can appear on any public occasion without commanding a cheer from the hearts of the people.

It is plainly the duty of the Navy Department to forbid the official recognition to Maclay's third volume, giving the history of the Spanish war, that has been already and perhaps justly awarded to his earlier volumes, when he was not called upon to deal with the disputed problems of the day. It is not a history; it is simply a compilation of defamation that reflects with equal injustice upon the hero of the great naval battle of Santiago, and upon every officer of the general government responsibly connected with the movements of our fleets.

ADDENDA.

Since the foregoing articles were published, Rear Admiral Schley has written the Navy Department asking for a court of inquiry. It was promptly granted, and Admiral Dewey and Rear Admirals Benham and Howison, both retired before the Spanish war, have been assigned as the court with the Judge Advocate of the Navy assigned to direct the trial. An attempt was made by the malignant naval coterie of Washington to have a Judge Advocate assigned to conduct the trial who was with Sampson at Santiago and is now serving with Sampson at the Boston Navy Yard, but public sentiment promptly forced a change in the programme. The court as organized has every appearance of fairness to all parties.

Several startling facts have been developed since the general criticism of Mr. Maclay's third volume of his naval history. He first announced to the public, in justification of his book, that proof sheets had been read and approved by Secretary Long, Admiral Sampson and many other naval officers. Secretary Long promptly contradicted the statement of the author, and said that he had received the proofs only of the chapters relating to the organization of the navy and preliminary naval movements in the Spanish war. He has also excluded the volume from the list of naval textbooks. Admiral Sampson was forced to confess that he had read the proofs commending himself and criticising Schley and returned them to the author with his approval, thus making Rear Admiral Sampson as much responsible to the public as Mr. Maclay himself for the malignant and false criticism of Schley.

Another important developement appears in the fact that Mr. Maclay has been inspired by high officials of the Navy Department to write this false and malicious story of the Santiago campaign, with the view of having it accepted at the Naval School as a text-book of naval history. In furtherance of this purpose Mr. Maclay has been carried on the pay roll of the Navy Department, at times as connected with a lighthouse, and is now carried on the pay roll as a common laborer, as some measure of compensation for the infamous duty he accepted. He could not be appointed to any official subordinate position in the navy, as that would make him answerable to the navy authorities for his appearance on the pay roll and drawing money for services he had not performed.

Rear Admiral Schley has maintained his usual discretion and refused to talk, but decided to act. It is intimated that the scope of inquiry will not be restricted, and that a full and complete presentation of the inner machinations of the navy will be unfolded to the world. If the court shall fail in that, it will become the duty of Congress to appoint a committee to make a complete and fearless investigation of the malignant despotism that has ruled the navy bureaus for some years past, extending to a measure of terrorism that has practically forbidden even social civilities to those who are not in favor with the navy authorities.

